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In their pursuit to boost female workforce participation, governments have introduced family 
policy measures with a two-fold goal: to stimulate more mothers into the labor market, and 
for more working mothers to work full-time. In this master thesis, I show that publically 
facilitated after-school care in Norway has met only the first target. 
I use observations from a Norwegian reform from 1997, which gave a large group of mothers 
in 44 municipalities sudden accessibility to after-school care. Within a difference-in-
differences research design, I separately examine the extensive and intensive margin of 
maternal employment. I find positive and statistically significant effects on mothers’ 
likelihood of entering the labor market. Simultaneously, however, the reform does not 
stimulate part-time working mothers to increase their labor supply. 




1 (En del av) de data som er benyttet i denne publikasjonen er hentet fra kommunedatabasen til NSD — Norsk senter for 
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"If the female employment rate in Norway was reduced to the average level in the 
OECD, the value of the production loss would equal Norway’s total oil wealth."  
Jens Stoltenberg (Aftenposten, 2012, own translation)  
 
Because labor is considered the most important resource in the Norwegian economy (St.Meld. 
29 2016-2017, p. 151), a generally high employment rate is a public policy objective (NOU 
2012: 15, p. 144). As Mr. Stoltenberg, the former prime minister of Norway, illustrated, the 
female labor supply represents a huge value to society. In addition to its vast economic 
potential, encouraging inclusion of women in the workforce also serves the purpose of gender 
equality: every citizen, regardless of their sex, should have equal rights and equal access to 
opportunities. 
A high female employment rate is often attributed to strong family policies; cash-benefits or 
in-kind services aimed at facilitating the everyday life of families enable parents, and 
especially mothers, to balance family life with a career. Publically provided after-school care 
for the youngest schoolchildren is one such policy instrument, and it is recommended by the 
OECD, who urge governments to “step up investments in out-of-school-hours care services, 
which can help parents with school-aged children participate in paid work full-time” (OECD, 
2017, p. 213). 
In this master thesis, I analyze the effects of after-school childcare on maternal employment 
by evaluating a Norwegian care program introduced in the 1990s, partly intended at bringing 
mothers into the workforce.  
In Figure 1.1, I compare the female employment rate in Norway (black) to the average female 
employment rate in the OECD (gray) from 1990 to 2015. The Norwegian rate lies above the 
OECD average during the whole period, even increasing the initial gap of 9 percentage points 
in 1990 to 16 percentage points in 2015. A noticeable characteristic of the consistently higher 
overall employment rate is the correlation with a high share of part-time employed women 
(dashed lines).  
	 2	
During the period, however, as Norway’s female employment rose and then stabilized around 
70 percent, the share of part-time employed women simultaneously decreased from 25 
percent in 1990 to 19 percent in 2015, while the OECD-share rose from 12 to 13 percent.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Female employment rates: Norway and the OECD, 1990 to 2015. 
Source: OECD. 
 
In the same timeframe as observed in Figure 1.1, the Norwegian after-school program 
Skolefritidsordningen (SFO) developed. This public childcare scheme, directed at 
schoolchildren less than 10 years of age, was introduced gradually at a local level from 1990 
onwards.  
In a report by the Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality from 2007, the authors 
recognize the rise in the female employment rate during the same period and suggest after-
school care as a positive contributor (Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, p. 17). Another 
government white paper from 2008 reports that mothers whose youngest child was between 7 
and 10 years old on average increased their weekly working hours by 4.2 hours from 1991 to 
2005, while mothers to children between 11 and 15 years of age increased their work load by 
only 1.7 hours per week.  
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This thesis will investigate the aforementioned correlations in seeking to answer the following 
research question: 
 
What is the effect of after-school care on maternal labor supply?   [1] 
 
The paper is structured in the following manner: in Chapter 2, I summarize the existing 
research on parental labor supply and school-level childcare arrangements. In Chapter 3, I 
make up the background of the analysis by describing the Norwegian after-school program 
and briefly outline the labor market trends of the most relevant policy-targets, mothers of 
school-aged children. In Chapter 4, I put forward the empirical strategy. In Chapter 5, I 
describe and assess the available data, before presenting the estimation results in Chapter 6. In 
Chapter 7, I perform specification checks and in Chapter 8, I give my concluding remarks. 
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2 Literature Review 
To my knowledge, no one has investigated research question [1] with Norwegian data prior to 
this thesis. Only one study has evaluated Norway’s after-school program (Kvalle and 
Wendelborg, 2002), but the aspect of parental employment was excluded from the review. In 
fact, the lack of systemized knowledge has led Norwegian parliamentarians to request a white 
paper on the after-school program from the government (Innst. 69 S, 2016–2017). There are, 
however, studies of similar programs from other countries. I present a selection of these 
articles in Section 2.1. Further, in Section 2.2, I review two articles for methodological 
reasons. Both articles have empirically analyzed kindergarten expansion and maternal labor 
supply in Norway. At last, in Section 2.3, I summarize the effects of after-school care found 
on mothers’ workforce participation. 
Following the literature, I distinguish between two different measures of change in 
employment, which I will continue to use in the rest of the text. Employment at the extensive 
margin considers any type of employment in contrast to unemployment. By using the measure 
of employment level at the extensive margin, an estimated model examines whether more 
individuals enter the labor market. Employment at the intensive margin, on the other hand, is 
based on much time employed individuals spend in the labor market. With this employment 
definition, the estimated models report whether the average working individual reduces or 
increases her labor supply.  
 
2.1 Evidence from other countries 
According to Blau and Currie (2006), there are three causes for public interference in the 
childcare market: (i) equity considerations, (ii) parental labor supply stimulation and (iii) 
market failures (p. 1196). Regarding the second cause, the authors suggest two motives. 
Firstly, childcare subsidies cost the taxpayer less than having parents on a welfare program, as 
government-run childcare can stimulate employment, thus increasing the tax base in the 
economy. Secondly, the employment of low-income earning mothers can have positive 
externalities (p. 1197). Blau and Currie’s survey reports positive effects of childcare access on 
the employment of parents with very young children, but finds no effect of after-school care 
for school-aged children. The article summarizes the economic research on childcare and 
labor supply as characterized by weak research designs, small sample sizes and lack of 
measurements of childcare quality (p. 1264).  
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Berthelon et al. (2015) study after-school care and mothers’ labor force participation by 
examining a Chilean school reform from 1996, which extended the school day for the 
country’s primary school pupils. The extension of the school day is considered an equivalent 
to after-school care. The Chilean reform was announced in 1996, but was administered at a 
local level, resulting in a gradual implementation of full-day school spreading geographically. 
Berthelon et al. look at the period from 2004 to 2009, during which the national share of full-
day schools increased from 34.7 percent to 55.4 percent. The maternal labor supply effect of 
full-day school is estimated only at the extensive margin, implying that the authors examine 
whether after-school care increases mothers’ workforce participation. Berthelon et al.  
identify the causal effect of school day extension by using municipal share of full-day schools 
as a representation of policy access, and then estimate a fixed-effects model. The main 
specification of the model contains fixed individual, municipal and regional characteristics to 
control for unobserved factors: holding time-invariant factors fixed, the mothers’ labor market 
response to a change in childcare access is the outcome of reform.  
Berthelon et al. report a statistically significant, positive effect of 11.9 percentage points in 
response to a municipality reaching complete full-day school coverage, finding strong 
indications of after-school care encouraging mothers to enter the labor market. 
In her working paper, Nemitz (2015) estimates a bivariate probit model using data from a 
German reform dated 2003. The reform involved the federal government allocating resources 
to the different states in order for the states to facilitate all-day school. Through information 
from questionnaires, Nemitz identifies a sample of mothers making use of the voluntary after-
school care scheme and mothers who do not. This serves to compare these two samples of 
mothers, defining the first one as a treatment group and the second one as a control group. 
The geographical variation in after-school care availability allows Nemitz to estimate an 
average treatment effect of the reform. Nemitz employs the number of schools at county-level 
receiving reform funds from the federal government as an instrument for the policy. The 
average treatment effect in her estimation is the average probability of employment post-
reform among mothers putting their child in after-school care subtracted the corresponding 
probability of mothers not making use of the scheme. Nemitz finds a 26 percentage points 
higher probability of employment for treated mothers relative to non-treated mothers, but no 
effect on full-time employment. 
	 6	
Considering the same German 2003-reform, but approaching with an empirical matching 
strategy, Gambaro et al. (2018) find positive effects of after-school care both on mothers' 
employment at the extensive margin as well as at the intensive margin. Gambaro et al. 
observe mothers at two stages: in the year before their child enters primary school and in the 
year after. The policy treatment is defined as making use of the after-school program during 
that school year between the observations. The treatment effect is the change in employment 
of treated mothers relative to the change in employment of non-treated mothers, before and 
after the child starts in first grade.  
In order to make the two groups more statistically similar, thereby more comparable, 
Gambaro et al. apply nonparametric entropy balancing, which weighs all the included 
variables of the control group so that every variable’s mean and variance is equal to the 
equivalent variable in the treatment group. The authors have highly detailed individual-level 
information, and exploit this by using a wide set of control variables, which in most studies 
are unobserved, e.g. the individual’s desired working hours. Gambaro et al. find that after-
school care had a positive effect of 11.4 percentage points at the extensive margin. They also 
report a positive effect at the intensive margin, as treated mothers increase their weekly 
working hours by 2.6 hours. 
In Felfe et al. (2016) the authors emphasize the endogeneity of after-school care 
implementation, as policy provision might have been driven by local preferences. If after-
school care access originates from endogenously made decisions, it will be difficult to 
identify the scheme’s true effects on maternal labor supply, because of unobserved underlying 
trends. Felfe et al. specifically mention the difference-in-differences method as vulnerable to 
this endogeneity concern, if the research design is not cautiously organized (p. 67).  
Felfe et al. restrict their sample to populations living in what they have classified as 
homogenous economic areas in Switzerland, which are divided by cantonal borders. Because 
after-school care facilitation is decided at a cantonal level and the sample population is 
categorized as equal in terms of preferences, the set up is more likely to detect causal effects.    
After confirming the cantonal variations in after-school care provision, Felfe et al. apply the 
2SLS strategy, using the number of after-school centers per 100 children as the instrument for 
cantonal enforcement of policy. In their main model, the authors find no effect at the 
extensive margin of maternal employment, but a 0.9 percentage point increase at the intensive 
margin. Even though the estimate holds a p-value of 10.4, implying an only nearly significant 
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coefficient, Felfe et al. conclude that one more after-school center allows one more mother to 
work full-time (p. 72).  
 
2.2 Methodological approaches 
The methodological approach by Havnes and Mogstad (2011) resembles the analytical 
framework of my own study. In their article, Havnes and Mogstad use the difference-in-
differences method to investigate the effects of Norwegian kindergarten coverage expansion 
in the 1970s, centered around a 1975 reform, on mothers’ employment. The authors construct 
a treatment group and a control group based on the pre-reform municipal coverage in 
childcare for 3- to 6-year-olds. They list all municipalities from the lowest coverage to the 
highest and define the treatment group as mothers living in municipalities with a coverage 
rate lower than the median rate, while the remaining mothers constitute the control group. 
Within the difference-in-differences research design, the causal effect is estimated as an 
average treatment effect, which distinguishes between the treatment group and the control 
group, and between the post-reform period and the pre-reform period. Estimating their model, 
Havnes and Mogstad find practically no effect of kindergarten expansion reform on maternal 
labor supply; universal kindergarten access did not stimulate mothers’ workforce 
participation, nor did it encourage full-time employment. The authors suspect that publically 
organized childcare may rather have crowded out other informal arrangements (p. 1464).  
Havnes and Mogstad also emphasize that the difference-in-differences method only identifies 
the immediate labor market response to reform, and that there might be substantial long run 
effects of women adjusting their human capital investments to the now accessible childcare. 
Revisiting the research question of Havnes and Mogstad (2011), Andresen and Havnes (2018) 
conduct a more sophisticated analysis, applying the 2SLS method on data from a Norwegian 
2002-kindergarten, focusing on mothers to children aged 1 year or 2 years old. In contrast to 
Havnes and Mogstad (2011), the authors do not identify only married mothers, but also 
cohabiting mothers, cohabiting fathers, as well as single mothers and non-resident fathers.  
Using the number of available childcare slots in the municipality as their instrument variable, 
Andresen and Havnes find significant positive effects of childcare on maternal employment, 
simultaneously as no effects on paternal employment. For cohabiting mothers, the effect is a 
29.4 percentage points’ increase, where almost every one of these going into full-time 
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employment. In the case of single mothers, there is an employment increase of 22.5 
percentage points, with practically all of them entering part-time employment. The 
considerable positive effects-results of Andresen and Havnes (2018) contrast the findings of 
Havnes and Mogstad (2011), and demonstrate how different methods and different data 
availability might reach different findings. 
 
2.3 Summary 
In Table 2.1, I summarize the empirical findings of the literature review. With the exception 
of Felfe et al. (2016), all reviewed articles find that after-school care schemes encourage 
mothers’ labor market participation. Berthelon et al. (2015) and Gambaro et al. (2018) both 
find estimates around 12 percentage points increase in maternal employment at the extensive 
margin, while Nemitz (2015) reports a 26 percentage points higher probability of 
employment.  
The effects of policy at the intensive margin of maternal employment, considering the 
findings of Gambaro et al. (2018) and Felfe et al. (2016) in particular, are also positive.  The 
consistently positive effects found in the literature suggest that similar childcare arrangements 
can expect similar results.   
Havnes and Mogstad (2011), however, who apply a difference-in-differences strategy on 




Table 2.1 Summary of literature review results 




 Ext.margin Int.margin 
Berthelon et al. 
(2015) 
Chile: Full-day school reform and mothers’ 




+ 11,9 pp.1 --- 
Nemitz (2015) 
Germany: Full-day school and mothers’ 
employment. Reform from 2002. 
5 010 /  
3 047 2 
Bivariate probit-
model 
+ 26 pp.3 No effect. 
Gambaro et al. 
(2018) 
Germany: Full-day school and after-school 
care, mothers’ employment. 
1 711 / 
 2 543 4 
Matching 
technique 
+ 11,4 pp. 
+ 2,6 
hours5 
xFelfe et al. 
(2016) 
Switzerland: After-school care. Cantonal 
differences, but homogenous economic areas. 




Norway: Kindergarten expansion and mothers’ 




No effect. No effect. 
Andresen and 
Havnes (2018) 
Norway: Kindergarten reform and parental 
employment. Reform from 2002. 
283 868 /  
33 288 6 
2SLS 
+29 pp. / +23 
pp.7 
+22 pp./--- 
1 By reaching full coverage. 
2 First sample consists of mothers  
3 Probability of being employed. 
4 First sample consiscts of mothers not employed pre-treatment, second sample consists of mothers already employed.  
5 Hours per week.  
6 Cohabiting mothers first, single mothers second. 
7  Cohabiting mothers first, single mothers second. 
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3 Institutional Setting 
 
3.1 History of the after-school program 
Skolefritidsordningen (SFO) is a municipal-level administered childcare scheme for 
schoolchildren between 6 and 9 years of age, which in the Norwegian school system 
corresponds to the 1st to the 4th grade of primary school (Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2015). The 
after-school program provides supervision from the end of the children's school day until the 
end of the parents’ workday. Attending the program is voluntary, and a child can either 
participate on a full-time basis (20 hours per week) or on a part-time basis (10 hours per 
week). Local authorities are responsible for financing the scheme, and make widespread use 
of parental payments. I hence refer to publically after-school care availability, in contrast to 
public after-school care provision. 
The total nationwide participation in the program from 1974 to 2017 is illustrated in Figure 
3.1. The black line represents the total number of schoolchildren in the relevant age group, in 
other words, the youngest pupils in primary school. In the old primary school structure, 
lasting from 1974 to 1996, this group consisted of children aged 7, 8 or 9 years old. The 1997 
school reform, marked by the vertical red line, warranted the entrance of 6-year-olds in 
primary school. From that year on, the black line also includes all children aged 6. The sharp 
decline in cohorts from 1974 to 1984 can be attributed to a decrease in the Norwegian birth 
rate from 2.75 in the late 1960s to 1.75 a decade later, signaling a change in family structures 
(Statistics Norway). 
The origins of the after-school program tells of a decentralized policy: a service that appeared 
at different times in different localities, with the first fritidshjem (leisure time center) 
established in Oslo in 1952, the demands of working mothers (NOU 1979: 29, p. 16). In 1974, 
as Figure 3.1 shows, after-school care was practically non-existing; only 250 children had 
access to organized supervision after the short schoolday was over. Around the same time, the 
Norwegian government recognized the general lack of childcare as the main obstacle facing 
women wanting to enter the labor market. The government, therefore, set out a new family 
policy, shifting the focus over to developing universally accessible services as an alternative 
to pure cash benefits (St. Meld. 51 1973-1974). 
Despite this new service-oriented approach, after-school care was not the target of any 
nationwide policy until 1990, when the different kinds of local after-school care schemes 
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were gathered under the term “skolefritidsordning” or SFO and the central government began 
allocating funds to build facilities for the service.  
Figure 3.1 shows the rise in participants from 8 900 in 1989 to 49 000 only five years later. 
The efforts by the then ruling government to develop the after-school program were at the 
core of their new family policy; gender equality was a supreme priority and public childcare 
was sharply in focus (St. Meld. 70 1991-1992). National provision of the after-school 
program was considered an important child-, school- and gender equality reform (p. 26). 
In 1993, the government announced an upcoming school reform, aimed at modernizing 
education. The expansion of the after-school program was to be a significant component of 
the reorganization of the primary school. It was argued that it would have positive effects not 
only for the children, but also for the parents (St. Meld. 40 1992-1993). The reform, named 
Reform97, was supposed to better reflect the structures of modern society, prepare the 
children for a modernized economy and build down educational differences originated in 
social inequalities (p. 7). The after-school program was, in 1992, already present in 342 of 
Norway’s 435 municipalities - a promising indication to the feasibility of the reform (p. 47). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. After-school care participation in total numbers, 1974 to 2017. 
Data sources: St. meld. nr. 51.(1973-1974); NOU 1979: 20; NOU 1984: 20; 
Statistics Norway; Utdanningsdirektoratet. 
 
In 1997, as 6-year-olds entered the 1st grade of primary school, the total number of children 
eligible for the after-school program grew from 170 000 to 240 000 in a year (the black line in 
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Figure 3.1). In the same year, the after-school program was nationalized by legislation: every 
municipality was to facilitate the service. Meanwhile, the number of participants grew from 
60 000 to 105 000 children (the gray line in Figure 3.1). Since 1997, the number of children 
aged 6 to 9 has been stable around the 250 000 mark, while the number of after-school 
program attendees has steadily grown from the aforementioned 105 000 to 160 000 in 2017.  
The rise in national after-school program participation observed in Figure 3.1 can be 
illustrated by a coverage rate. Figure 3.2 graphs the steep elevation in the share of eligible 
schoolchildren taking part in the program, during the first half of the 1990s. A government 
white paper outlining the after-school program push of Reform97 reports that 88 percent of 
the country’s municipalities offered after-school care in 1996, but that the coverage rate 
varied geographically (St. Meld. 55 (1996-1997), p. 2).  
The after-school program coverage experienced a sharp increase from 36 percent to 44 
percent in the year 1997. The development of the after-school program, however, was most 
rapid in the early 1990s. The figure, looking at coverage rate and not total participation 
numbers, indicate that participation did not only rise due to belated municipalities introducing 
it in 1997, but steadily rose among the municipalities that had already provided the scheme 
prior to 1997. Since the reform, coverage has continued to rise, eventually stabilizing around 
60 percent in 2017. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. After-school program coverage, 1974 to 2017. 
Data sources: St. meld. nr. 51.(1973-1974); NOU 1979: 20; NOU 1984: 20; 






























































































































After-school program participation is, furthermore, contingent upon the child’s age. The 
youngest schoolchildren, aged 6 and 7, are the most frequent users of after-school care. Figure 
3.3 graphs the development of the coverage rate by children’s age around the time of the 
reform. Children aged 6 did not attend primary school before 1997. Therefore, in the years 
1995 and 1996, I have graphed the share of 6-year-olds being full-time in an educational 
program specifically designed for 6-year-olds (Statistics Norway, 1996). Participation growth 
is not limited to 6-year-olds, meaning their entry into primary school is not the sole driving 
force of the collective growth. The positive evolution of other age cohorts from 1996 to 1997 
shows a wider tendency to use after-school care to a larger degree after Reform97. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Share of children in 1st to 4th grade in after-school care or equivalent schemes, 
1995-1998. 
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
 
3.2 Female employment in Norway 
Norway’s economy is characterized by a high female employment rate. In 2015, 68 percent of 
women between 16 and 65 years old participated in the labor market. Only Iceland (80 
percent) and Sweden (70 percent) had larger shares of women employed (OECD, 2019).  
Figure 3.4 compares the employment rates of Norwegian men and women between 15 and 75 
years old, respectively, in the time period between 1986 and 2010. The figure – where male 




















follow similar short-term trend lines. However, on the longer term, from 1985 to 2010, the 
share of employed men decreased from 76 percent to 71 percent, whereas the share of 
employed women increased from 58 percent to 68 percent, narrowing the gender gap by 15 
percentage points. 
The simultaneous rise in both employment rates around the reform year 1997, and in 
particular the rise in male employment, indicates an overall boom in the Norwegian economy 
at the time. This suggests that other forces than family policy exclusively, can be driving 
factor behind growing female workforce participation. However, a childcare scheme like the 
after-school program might actually enable the relevant mothers to respond to these 
underlying economic changes and take part in the labor market, so the scheme becomes, 
through this mechanism, a contributing factor to the increase.   
 
 
Figure 3.4. Employment rates in Norway, 1985 to 2010. 
Data source: Statistics Norway. 
 
Breaking down the female employment rate by age group, employment trends can be 
narrowed down to the women most likely to be affected by the after-school care reform. 
Figure 3.5 displays the age group of mothers to 6-year-olds in 1997. Of all children born in 
1991, 36 of them were born by mothers who in 1997 are between 30 and 34 years old. Two 
other age groups of mothers also stand out: 20 percent of mothers are 25 to 29 years old, and 



































































































to 44 years old. Only very few mothers younger than 25 or older than 45 years old have 
children eligible for the after-school program. 
 
 
Figure 3.5.	Proportional size of age group to mothers of all six-year-olds, year 1997. 
 Data source: Statistics Norway. 
 
Figure 3.6 highlights the employment trends of the defined age groups (solid lines), as well as 
the employment rates of other age groups (dashed lines) for all women, mothers of children 
all ages and non-mothers combined.  
The 25 to 44 year olds are generally the most active on the labor market. If the reform has 
brought mothers to young schoolchildren to the labor market, mothers aged between 25 and 
44 years should see a rise in employment relative to mothers in other age groups. Not all 
women are mothers of young children at any given time and these overall employment rates 
may thus be skewed. This notwithstanding, I expect the employment of women and mothers 
of each age group to follow similar trend lines, with changes for young children's mothers 
being reflected in the overall employment for women. 
There seems to be a long-term upward trend among the age groups from 25 to 44 years old, as 
their employment rates in the 2000s stabilize at a higher level than in the late 1980s. Only the 
age group of 25- to 29-year-olds (the green line) sees a sudden upturn in employment after 
1997. However, this group’s trend was positive also before 1997. 
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Even though after-school care of children is thought to alleviate the burden on mothers, this 
cannot be concluded based on the overall employment trends observed in Figure 3.6.  
Publically organized childcare could instead replace private day-care services or informal 
arrangements, with nearby-living grandparents, for example. Alternatively, as the after-school 
program developed from 1990 onwards, the employment trends might reflect effects of the 
early efforts ahead of the 1997-reform. Again, no conclusion on this matter can be drawn 
based on Figure 3.6.   
 
 
Figure 3.6. Female employment rates of different age groups, Norway, 1985 to 2010. 















































































































4 Empirical Strategy 
I examine the research question [1] using a methodological framework similar to that of 
Havnes and Mogstad (2011). I consider the Norwegian school reform of 1997 a natural 
experiment and estimate the effect of the subsequent after-school care access on maternal 
labor supply with a difference-in-differences (DD) estimate.  
Because it is the central government that imposed the policy - requiring municipalities to 
provide after-school care - I am able to isolate and study causal effects of sudden after-school 
care availability. With the DD method, I compare maternal employment outcomes of two 
groups of mothers over time. One group gains unique access to after-school care through 
Reform97, while the other group of mothers does not. Thus, I have a policy-receiving 
treatment group and an unaffected control group to compare it with.  
The DD method reports an average treatment effect, which distinguishes the average post-
reform outcome of the treatment group from the average post-reform outcome of the control 
group, and is described by [2] (Wooldridge, 2012, p. 369). The effect of a policy can be 
understood as the average change in post-reform employment outcome of the treatment 
group, denoted by T, subtracted by the equivalent change of the control group, denoted by C2. 
 
    [2] 
 
A central feature of the difference-in-differences research design is that it does not require 
equal employment levels between the comparison groups prior to reform for the average 
treatment effect to be legitimate. The validity of the results rests upon satisfying the common 
trends assumption (Angrist and Pischke 2015, p. 179), which is described in Figure 4.1. 
If the employment trends of the two groups prior to reform are similar, it is reasonable to 
assume that the future trends would continue to be similar in the counterfactual case of no 
reform. Correspondingly, the factual post-reform trend of the control group represents the 
hypothetical post-reform trend of the treatment group. The DD estimate of [2], marked by the 
																																								 																					
2 The estimate  can also be understood in the following way: 
	δ̂DD = [ yT ,POST − yT ,PRE ]−[ yC ,POST − yC ,PRE ]
 
	δ̂DD = [ yT ,POST − yT ,PRE ]−[ yC ,POST − yC ,PRE ]
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red line3, tells us how mothers acquiring sudden access to after-school care respond to policy 
in the labor market. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. An illustration of the difference-in-difference method. 
Source: own. 
 
4.1 Identification of treatment 
Two constraints have shaped my identification strategy. The first is access to data; I neither 
have data on individual use of after-school care, nor on municipal coverage. I only have 
knowledge of the municipalities' general after-school care offer. Statistics Norway provides 
employment data for the years 1996 to 2003 on mothers who gave birth between 1982 and 
1995. The data observations thus start one year before the reform, and includes mothers of 
children eligible for the reform, and of children in adjacent age ranges - too young or too old.  
The other constraint is the existence of local after-school care provision prior to Reform97. 
According to St. Meld. 55 (1996-1997, p. 2), 88 percent of Norwegian municipalities already 
organized public after-school by the fall of 1996. That leaves me to consider only individuals 
in the remaining 12 percent of municipalities, which Reform97 had a direct impact on. By 
lack of a better term – because Reform97 as a school reform did affect all municipalities – I 
will refer to these municipalities as Reform97-municipalities. 
																																								 																					
3 Note that the estimated average treatment effect will not equal the value of the red line’s graphical length, but 
rather report the average value of each yearly post-reform change combined. 
	19	
A request was sent to 99 percent of Norwegian municipalities in early 2018 – all for which 
viable contact information was found – to provide the date and extent of the introduction of 
public after-school care. Table 4.1 presents an overview of the survey's metadata, while the 
responding local authorities' self-reported first year of offering after-school care is graphed in 
Figure 4.2. Of the 314 municipalities that confirmed receiving my inquiry, 107 gave an exact 
year of after-school care introduction, and thus qualified to be included in the analysis.  
 
Table 4.1 Overview of local authorities’ response to after-school care inquiry 
Number of municipalities in total (2018) 422 
Number of municipalities reached by e-mail 417 
Number of municipalities confirmed receiving e-mail 314 
Number of municipalities with response 141 
Number of municipalities providing information 129 
Number of municipalities included in analysis 107 
Number of Reform97-municipalities 44 




Figure 4.2 strongly suggests a direct impact from Reform97 on local after-school program 
provision: 36 municipalities implemented it in 1997, significantly more than in any other 
year. Eight, mostly small, municipalities did not implement the reform in 1997, but shortly 
thereafter, in 1998 or in 1999. I consider these 44 latecomer municipalities to have 
implemented the after-school care program as a direct consequence of Reform97. Only for 
these municipalities is the policy exogenously applied and the treatment randomized. 
Knowing that 12 percent of municipalities had no after-school care prior to 1997 (St. Meld. 
55, 1996-1997, p. 2), there were 50 or 51 Reform97-municipalities. The 44 identified 
Reform97-municipalities represent 10 percent of Norway's municipalities and 86 to 88 percent 




Figure 4.2. Introduction of after-school program over time. Number of municipalities per 
year (from group of included responders)4. Source: own. 
 
A descriptive cross-section regression shows how the Reform97-municipalities compare to the 
63 other existing municipalities. It uses Reform97-status as the outcome variable and a set of 
municipal characteristics, such as political preferences, demographic composition and the 
state of the economy, collected from the Regional Database at the Norwegian Social Research 
Centre as input variables. 
The municipal share of conservative votes in the 1996 parliamentary election is used to proxy 
political preferences, i.e. the political affiliation and values of the municipal population, not 
the political realities of after-school care implementation. If the Reform97-municipalities tend 
to be more conservative it could be correlated with a preference for traditional gender roles, 
whereby women work less. Thus, a public demand for after-school care is weak, which might 
explain why local authorities have avoided after-school care introduction. 
The demographic input variable is the share of women aged 50 or more, because these 
potential grandmothers may represent an alternative care arrangement, and hence, a smaller 
need for public after-school care. The economic input variables are the unemployment rate for 
men and for women, respectively, and the average income level, each per municipality in the 
year 1997. 
																																								 																					























1990	 1991*	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996	 Reform: 
1997	















For each characteristic, municipalities are given a dummy variable. The dummy is equal to 
one if the municipality is above the sample's median value, or zero if it is below that median. 
The regression results can be found in Table A.1 in the appendix and report no significant 
effects of any of the municipal characteristic on being a Reform97-municipality. The 
Reform97-municipalities are statistically similar to other municipalities.  
The main data sample consists of mothers living in the 44 Reform97-municipalities from 1996 
to 2003. Any mother to a child who would be eligible for after-school care in 1996 and in 
1997 (being 6, 7 or 8 years old in 1996) is defined as in the treatment group. The treatment is 
the availability of after-school care for their child in 1997.  
The control group is made to be as similar to the treatment group as possible in terms of 
underlying characteristics; yet they must differ in their access to after-school care. Access is 
decided by a strict age limit, despite age varying gradually. I thus choose mothers to primary 
school-aged children who would be non-eligible in 1996 and in 1997, i.e. children aged 10, 11 
and 12 years old in 1996, as the control group.  
To summarize: First, I follow the same mothers over time, from 1996 to 2003. Second, all 
mothers come from the 44 Reform97-municipalities; none of them had access to public after-
school care prior to 1997. Third, without municipal coverage as an instrumental variable, I 
measure the effects of the intention to treat and not of the treatment received. For that reason, 
I refer to the estimates as effects of after-school care availability, keeping in mind that the 
program was, and still is, based on voluntary participation and parental payments. 
 
4.2 Threats to the empirical strategy 
Three threats could undermine the estimation results: a violation of the common trends 
assumption, selection problems, and data interference from competing policies. 
The DD design is convenient because it allows for differences between groups. However, if 
the condition of common trends pre-reform is not satisfied, the control group's post-reform 
employment trend is not a legitimate counterfactual. With observations starting one year 
before the reform, the pre-reform trends of the two groups can neither be assessed, nor 
compared.  
To overcome this shortcoming, I use aggregate Norwegian data that resembles my treatment 
and control groups from the Reform97-municipalities, and test the common trends assumption 
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with it instead. Figure 4.3 shows full-time employment of mothers with children aged 
between 7 and 10 years old (black), and the development of mothers with children aged 11 to 
15 years old (gray) from 1991 to 2004. The first group serves as an equivalent of the 
treatment group and the second, an equivalent of the control group. The vertical line marks 
Reform97.  
Figure 4.3 brings forward two points. Firstly, mothers of young children work consistently 
less full-time than their counterparts with older children, potentially indicating a higher need 
of childcare. Secondly, and most importantly, despite short-term differences, the employment 
rates roughly move in the same upwards direction. I consider the pre-reform trends of the two 
groups to be sufficiently similar to satisfy the condition of common trends. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Employment trends for employed mothers with children aged 7 to 10 years old 
and employed mothers with children aged 11 to 15 years old. 1991 to 1998.  
Data source: Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, 2007. 
 
The second threat to the research design is a methodological critique proposed by Felfe et al. 
(2016). It questions the DD strategy’s ability to handle potential selection problems. Selection 
occurs at two levels: an individual mother could select into the treatment or control groups, or 
at the policy level, when the policy is introduced to the treatment group non-randomly. For 
example, when treatment is conditioned upon geography, there could be selective migration 
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care (policy level). These violations of the randomness assumption would make the DD 
estimate positively biased. 
With the proposed setup, however, individual selection bias would only occur if women 
actively chose between giving birth in 1984-1986 or rather in 1988-1990 (regardless of their 
own age), which is highly unlikely. There is a higher possibility for a policy selection bias: 
children aged 10 to 12 are, as a matter of fact, older, and more likely to be independent. There 
would be reasons for the policy to target the youngest schoolchildren, and there could be 
substantial differences in how the policy truly affects their mothers. 
The third threat is influence from other policies on the same mothers’ employment. If these 
are being introduced, enhanced or developed in the same period as the after-school program, 
they can lead to an overestimation of the true effect of after-school care availability. Note, 
however, that a bias-inducing policy must apply specifically to the mothers in the treatment 
group. If all mothers, on the other hand, are affected by it, the policy does not compromise the 
validity of the results. To my knowledge, no such policy was introduced simultaneously with 
Reform97 (Vollset, 2011).  
 
4.3 An alternative approach 
Children's age is not the only possible distinction between treatment and control. Another 
alternative is to use mothers with SFO-eligible children living in Reform97-municipalities in 
1996 as a treatment group and the equivalent mothers in other municipalities as a control 
group.  
This approach breaks with a standard DD set up because the control group has received 
treatment prior to reform and continues being treated after reform. For such a strategy to be 
valid, the employment trends between treatment municipalities and control municipalities 
must be parallel after Reform97.  
The strategy is appealing because it compares mothers with children of the same age. These 
mothers are expected to resemble in terms of underlying characteristics. However, it has a 
serious flaw: the possible endogeneity of treatment. Underlying factors affecting local 
childcare policy come in different shapes. On the demand side, mothers in a certain area 
might have a stronger preference for care services, or may have selectively migrated to 
municipalities that would offer it. On the supply side, some municipalities introduced the 
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policy voluntarily, and likely planned and budgeted for its introduction, possibly affecting 
volume, price, quality and publicity. These disturbances would lead mothers in control 
municipalities to have a stronger treatment received than mothers in the treatment group. This 
importance difference, however, would not be captured by the analysis, but stay hidden 
behind an intention-to-treat, which would completely similar across locations.  
 The descriptive statistics and results for this alternative are presented in the appendix, 
together with corresponding figures. The results chapter will include comments on these 
results, as a means of comparison with the main results.  
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5 Descriptive Statistics and Model 
The detailed nature of Statistics Norway's data have allowed me to narrow down to mothers 
living in the 44 identified Reform97-municipalities who gave birth in the period 1982 to 1995, 
and to control for individual factors such as immigration background, education level and age. 
Employment figures, given annually from 1996 to 2003, are classified into four workload 
bins, according to average weekly working hours. A mother is yearly registered either as (i) 
unemployed, (ii) short part-time employed (4 to 19 working hours per week on average), (iii) 
long part-time employed (20 to 29 hours) or (iv) full-time employed (over 30 hours). 
In order to follow the same mothers over time, the data sample is restricted to mothers with a 
child aged 6, 7, 8, 10, 11 or 12 in 1996. Mothers of children aged 9 year in 1996 are excluded 
from the data sample, as explained in Section 4.1. The treatment group includes 5 388 
mothers and the control group, 7 636 mothers.  
Table 5.1 displays a comparison of the two groups based on mothers' individual 
characteristics and reveals the two groups to have fairly similar features. Trivially, mothers in 
the control group (with younger children) are on average younger than their control group 
counterparts (with older children), and the average age in both groups increases with 7 years 
over the period.  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of main sample 









Employment variables     
Employment 54.96 59.68 88.83 88.45 
        Full-time employed 45.76 42.71 59.26 60.78 
        Part-time employed, 4-19 hours 27.97 28.87 18.99 17.81 
        Part-time employed, 20-29 hours 26.27 28.42 21.63 21.40 
Control variables     
Age, mother 33.15 37.90 40.15 44.90 
Higher education, share of mothers 58.76 50.89 57.63 50.89 
Immigrant, share of mothers 5.77 4.77 5.77 4.77 
Age, father1 36.11 40.87 43.04 47.76 
Higher education, share of fathers 62.25 58.00 61.36 58.03 
Observations 5 388 7 636 5 388 7 636 
1Number of observations for fathers in equal horizontal order: 5 205; 7 327; 5 234; 7 388. 
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The employment statistic reports an average pre-reform gap in total employment of 4.72 
percentage points. However, treatment group mothers’ employment is to a larger degree 
characterized by full-time employment.  
The largest gap between the two groups, of 8 percentage points, occurs for the pre-reform 
share of higher education (being education beyond high school, i.e. for over 12 years). 
Mothers of younger children enter higher education more frequently perhaps a general trend 
occurring over time, driven by their, on average, slightly younger age.  
From 1996 to 2003, both groups experience overall employment growth (34 percentage points 
for treated mothers, 29 for untreated). Relatively, however, the employment gap is reduced. In 
2003, for both groups, more employed mothers work full-time (increase of 13.5 percentage 
points for treated, 18 for untreated). Not only is the gap between the groups reduced, it 
actually reverses the advantage: working mothers in the treatment group go from being the 
most full-time employed mothers, to instead undertake part-time employment to a larger 
degree. 
The observed differences between the groups fall into the realm over expected variations and 
are considered acceptable for a truthful and credible comparative analysis. 
 
5.1 The equation 
Equation [3] describes the employment outcome y of a mother i in year t. All estimations will 
be based on it. 
 
	yit = β0 +β1Treatedi +β2Postt +β3Treatedi ×Postt +β4Xit + ε it 	 	 [3]	
 
The difference-in-differences model is characterized by two dummy variables. Post divides 
the analysis period into a post-reform period by holding value 1 for all observations from 
1997 to 2003, and a pre-reform period, holding value 0 for observations in 1996. As seen in 
Figure 4.1, eight municipalities introduce after-school care after 19975. In their case, Post 
																																								 																					
5 These municipalities include: Hemsedal, Lesja, Vega, Ørland (1998) and Hol, Kvinnherad, Svelvik, Utsira 
(1999). 
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only holds the value 1 from the year they introduce after-school care, i.e. 1998 or 1999, and 
onwards.  
The variable Treated is equal to 1 for the identified treatment group and 0 for the control 
group. The average treatment effect of [3] is thereby estimated by the interaction of Post and 
Treated, which reports the post-reform change in outcome exclusively for the treated sample. 
The Post estimate is the average outcome of the control group and to be understood as the 
counterfactual post-reform outcome of the treatment group. The interaction estimate of β3 is 
therefore to be interpreted in relation to the coefficient of Post. 
A set of individual control variables is included in the vector X in order to isolate the 
treatment's effect on the outcome variable. These are four dummy variables: whether the 
individual is born in Norway, whether the individual has more than 12 years of education and 
two variables describing age; the first is true if the individual was younger than 30 years old 
in 1996, the second is true if the individual was older than 39 years old.  
The last input variable, ε, is an error term. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, I also 
include fixed effects at a municipal level. The fixed effects control for time-invariant 
unrevealed characteristics. In the given context, this could include local employment trends or 
after-school care prices. 
I now turn to the output variable y. Employment may change in two ways: mothers may enter 
or exit the workforce (the extensive margin), and working mothers can increase or reduce the 
amount of hours worked (the intensive margin). Both of these effects are of societal interest, 
as is a third one: the share of employed women in full-time employment. Equation [3] can be 
designed according to each of these three types of changes in employment, forming three 
separate regression analyses.  
First, I estimate employment at the extensive margin. In this case, all observations from the 
main sample are included and the outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
individual is employed, or to 0 if the individual is unemployed. The estimation at the 
extensive margin reveals whether the reform brings new mothers into the labor market. 
In the second set of estimations, I examine how after-school access encourages employment 
at the intensive margin, i.e. if the average mother increases her labor supply. The data sample 
is restricted to mothers working part-time prior to reform. The individual can either move 
from short part-time employment to long part-time employment or full-time employment, or 
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move from long-term employment into full-time employment. The outcome dummy yit equals 
1 if the registered labor supply in year t is higher than the labor supply of individual i in 1996, 
and equals 0 if it is equal to or lower than in 1996. The intensive margin effect is measured as 
the likelihood of working more hours per week post-reform. 
In the third set of estimations, I consider only the effect on full-time employment, which is a 
policy objective. The outcome variable of equation [3] is equal to 1 if the individual is full-
time employed and 0 otherwise. The data sample contains all mothers of the main sample 
employed in 1996. This regression investigates whether Reform97 has shifted the gravity of 
maternal employment towards more full-time employment. 
Because all the possible output variables and the input variables are dummy variables, the 
resulting coefficients can be understood as percentage point effects. All estimates result from 




6 Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results from the estimations of equation [3] show a two-sided effect of after-
school care availability on maternal employment. After-school care access has a positive 
effect at the extensive margin of employment. As intended, the reform seems to encourage 
more mothers to enter the labor market. At the intensive margin of employment, however, the 
results suggest that after-school care discourages maternal labor intensity. Employed mothers 
in the treatment group appear to be less likely to increase their labor supply, and also less 
likely to start working full-time. This contradicts the intention of the policy. The empirical 
findings are consistent over a large set of subsamples. 
 
6.1 Main sample 
Difference-in-differences estimations report three coefficients to consider. In Table 6.1, the 
estimates of Treated reveal the added employment probability of being a treatment group 
mother versus being a control group mother. This is an expression of the pre-reform 
employment gap between the two groups. The coefficient of Post-reform represents the post-
reform employment increase of the control group, i.e. the likely counterfactual post-reform 
trend of the treatment group. The Diff-in-diff estimate reports the change in outcome after 
reform exclusively for the treated mothers, in relation to the Post-reform estimate, and can be 
interpreted as the effect of policy. 
Table 6.1 displays the estimation results from regressions on the main sample, with mothers 
of older primary-school children as the control group. Each column represents a specified 
model. The models differ in the employment measure used as the outcome variable, the 
sample used, and the inclusion of individual control variables and of municipal fixed effects.  
In columns (1) and (2), I use the whole main sample and consider employment at the 
extensive margin. In columns (3) and (4), I present the labor supply response at the intensive 
margin of mothers working part-time in 1996. Columns (5) and (6) exhibit the effect of 
reform in full-time employment, using a sample of mothers employed in 1996. 
The model in column (1) indicates a significant pre-reform employment gap of -4.44 
percentage points, an overall employment growth of 19.10 percentage points and an average 
treatment effect of 3.58 percentage points. When including individual control variables and 
municipal fixed effects in column (2), the pre-reform employment gap is -5.00 percentage 
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points, the post-reform employment growth is of 19.12 percentage points, and the average 
treatment effect is statistically significant and equals 3.55 percentage points.  
The policy effect in column (2) is noticeably lower than the policy effects uncovered by 
Berthelon et al. (2015), Gambaro et al. (2018) and Nemitz (2015). In comparison to the no-
effect result of Felfe et al. (2016), it is clearly larger. 
The interpretation of the result should be understood in the particular context of this analysis. 
After-school care is based on voluntary participation and its sole availability implies an 
intention-to-treat effect. Furthermore, mothers of eligible children are not perfectly 
comparable to mothers of older schoolchildren, as the initial need for treatment may be lower 
in the latter group. Controlling for education and age, both of which influence employment 
opportunities, the identified treatment reduces the pre-reform employment gap by 71 percent6. 
 
Table 6.1 Main regressions. Main sample. Extensive margin, intensive margin and full-time 
employment, respectively. OLS. 
















Treated -.0444*** -.0500*** -.0075** -.0233*** .0161 .0139 
 (.0070) (.0067) (.0034) (.0048) (.0135) (.0131) 
       
Post-reform .1910*** .1912*** .3962*** .3974*** .1199*** .1200*** 
 (.0087) (.0086) (.0161) (.0160) (.0071) (.0072) 
       
Diff-in-diff .0358*** .0355** -.0248 -.0245 -.0253* -.0252* 
 (.0060) (.0059) (.0171) (.0171) (.0135) (.0135) 
       
Intercept .6047*** .5700*** .0319** .0078 .4226*** .3691*** 
 (.0115) (.0065) (.0142) (.0107) (.0136) (.0099) 
N 104 192 104 192 33 736 33 736 60 144 60 144 
R2 within .0289 .0455 .0796 .0828 .0060 .0185 
R2 between .0103 .0569 .0014 .0144 .0018 .0058 
R2 overall .0282 .0456 .0770 .0802 .0057 .0178 
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Municipal FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Columns (3) and (4) indicate a negative maternal labor supply response to after-school care 
availability at the intensive margin. Treated mothers have an overall lower labor intensity, as 
indicated by the statistical significant negative coefficient of Treated. Post-treatment indicates 
																																								 																					
6 Column (2) of Table 6.1: Diff-in-diff coefficient as share of Treated coefficient. 
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a general move into more intensive employment. The estimated average treatment effect is 
negative with -2.45 percentage points. However, it is not statistically significant, so the result 
can only be understood as an indication. 
Contrary to the findings of Gambaro et al. (2018) and Felfe et al. (2016), which both report 
positive effects, models (5) and (6) find a negative effect of after- school care access on full-
time employment. Employed treatment group mothers are in general more likely to be full-
time employed, but following the introduction of public after-school care, the likelihood 
decreases by -2.53 percentage points relative to their hypothetical potential. 
Figures 6.1 to 6.4 are graphical illustrations of the results in Table 6.1. Figure 6.1 depicts the 
employment rates of treated versus non-treated mothers, with a black line and a gray line, 
respectively. The figure presents the initial gap in employment between the two groups, and 
shows how the two lines converge after reform, with the employment rate of treated mothers 
eventually surpassing the one of non-treated mothers. Figure 6.1 is an indication of after-
school care access meeting its target of stimulating maternal employment. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Employment rate from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group (black lines) vs. Control 
group (gray lines). Main sample. 
 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 describe the employment patterns of employed mothers. Figure 6.2, 
considers pre-reform part-time employed mothers only, while Figure 6.3 includes all pre-
reform employed mothers. In both figures, both types of part-time employment see a general 
downward trend, with a corresponding upward trend in full-time employment.  
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Figure 6.2: Employment status from 1996 to 2003.  
Treatment group (black lines) vs. Control group (gray lines). From main sample: 
Part-time employed in 1996. 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Employment status from 1996 to 2003.  
Treatment group (black lines) vs. Control group (gray lines). From main sample: 
Employed in 1996. 
 
Differences between the comparison groups also become evident. Figure 6.2 corroborates the 
indication by model (4): the move into a more intensive labor supply is weaker among treated 
mothers than among non-treated mothers. While the majority of mothers in both groups enter 
full-time employment, non-treated mothers do so more frequently. The share of treated 
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mothers working long part-time increases after 1997, which is consistent with the results in 
model (6). 
In Figure 6.4, the four employment statuses are given as shares of the whole main sample. 
The treatment group increases its labor supply relative to the control group by reducing 
unemployment rates and growing its share of part-time work, not of full-time work. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Employment status from 1996 to 2003.  
Treatment group (black lines) vs. Control group (gray lines). Main sample. 
 
The negative effect on the intensive margin (columns (3) to (6) in Table 6.1) might be 
explained by an income effect (Vuri, 2016). Before the introduction of publically organized 
childcare, employed mothers might have worked full-time while also privately financing 
some other supervision arrangement. If the new public option is cheaper, thanks to subsidies 
or economies of scale, some mothers may reduce their labor supply because they now can 
generate the same amount of net income by working fewer hours (Vuri, 2016 p. 4). 
The generality of the results have been tested for each of the three employment definitions. 
Equation [3] has been re-estimated using different subpopulations of the main sample. The six 
subsamples are based on relevant individual characteristics: being foreign-born, having higher 
education, having high-school education, being younger than 30 years of age, being between 
30 and 39 years of age, as well as being older than 39 years old (age ranges conditioned on 
the year 1996). 
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The extensive margin of employment for each subsample is shown in Table 6.2, the intensive 
margin, in Table 6.3, and the empirical results with a full-time employment measure, in Table 
6.4. Overall, the subsample regression results are consistent with the results from the main 
sample. After-school care availability stimulates employment, but has a negative effect on 
labor intensity in general and full-time employment in particular. 
The main results appear to be most applicable for mothers with higher education, which by 
each employment measure have statistically significant results. After-school care access 
impacts foreign-born mothers the most; Reform97 reduces their likelihood of increasing their 
labor supply by 11.53 percentage points and their likelihood of full-time employment by 7.04 
percentage points. 
 










Age < 30 
(5) 
30 < Age < 39 
(6) 
39 < Age 
Treated -.1218*** -.0497*** -.0506*** -.0102 -.0235** -.0355 
 (.0380) (.0088) (.0101) (.0316) (.0102) (.0225) 
       
Post-reform .3004*** .1862*** .1959*** .2770*** .2095*** .1518*** 
 (.0194) (.0103) (.0083) (.0254) (.0095) (.0076) 
       
Diff-in-diff .0183 .0305*** .0459** .0048 .0059 .0118 
 (.0252) (.0069) (.0100) (.0234) (.0075) (.0136) 
       
Intercept .4302*** .6677** .5732*** .4573*** .5654*** .5682*** 
 (.0336) (.0081) (.0104) (.0280) (.0084) (.0097) 
N 5 400 56 416 47 776 14 416 61 472 28 304 
R2 within .0735 .0368 .0317 .0689 .0417 .0433 
R2 between .0086 .0359 .0161 .0338 .0463 .0018 
R2 overall .0757 .0408 .0315 .0682 .0415 .0449 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 















Age < 30 
(5) 
30 < Age < 39 
(6) 
39 < Age 
Treatment .0361 -.0054 -.0351*** -.0030 -.0114*** -.0044 
 (.0476) (.0065) (.0080) (.0202) (.0039) (.0061) 
       
Post-reform .4338*** .4309*** .3618*** .4385*** .4063*** .3798*** 
 (.0327) (.0175) (.0174) (.0482) (.0177) (.0149) 
       
Diff-in-diff -.1153* -.0507** .0025 -.0314 -.0502*** -0095 
 (.0598) (.0198) (.0189) (.0534) (.0187) (.0279) 
       
Intercept .1129*** .0269** .0353*** .0379 .0061 -.0200 
 (.0351) (.0111) (.0124) (.0245) (.0151) (.0151) 
N 1 096 18 104 15 632 4 136 20 024 9 576 
R2 within .1124 .0900 .0769 .0908 .0838 .0848 
R2 between .0048 .0004 .0069 .0821 .0474 .0430 
R2 overall .0945 .0863 .0748 .0873 .0817 .0799 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 














Age < 30 
(5) 
30 < Age < 39 
(6) 
39 < Age 
Treatment .0643 .0343** -.0104 -.0485 .0527*** -.0257 
 (.0491) (.0158) (.0286) (.0459) (.0148) (.0242) 
       
Post-reform .1090*** .1244*** .1143*** .1581*** .1256*** .1096*** 
 (.0274) (.0093) (.0099) (.0411) (.0087) (.0074) 
       
Diff-in-diff -.0704** -.0437*** -.0058 -.0276 -.0528*** .0088 
 (.0339) (.0137) (.0187) (.0509) (.0133) (.0208) 
       
Intercept .4518*** .4685*** .3825*** .4106*** .3640*** .3676*** 
 (.0297) (.0100) (.0112) (.0453) (.0134) (.0126) 
N 2 168 35 424 24 720 6 976 35 800 17 368 
R2 within .0082 .0090 .0073 .0152 .0144 .0336 
R2 between .0003 .0485 .0006 .0527 .0151 .1603 
R2 overall .0071 .0083 .0072 .0134 .0140 .0337 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 




6.1 The alternative approach 
The empirical results and related figures of the proposed alternative approach can be found in 
the appendix. At the extensive margin, the most specified model presents a statistical 
significant negative average treatment effect of -1.91 percentage points. This result implies 
that after-school care in fact dissuades mothers from entering the workforce.  
Such a response is difficult to justify, even by an income effect. It seems more plausible that 
the common trends assumption is violated. The control group municipalities are, in fact, still 
absorbing the effects from the previously introduced SFO supply. The DD method would 
have been able to overcome this shortcoming, had it not been for another concern, namely, 
that for the control group municipalities, the policy is endogenous and hence, positively 
biased.  
With reference to these potential issues, I have decided not to emphasize the results from the 
alternative approach. However, as my concerns are not proven to be true, I choose to give the 
results and illustrative figures in the appendix.   
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7 Specification Checks 
A varied set of specification checks can further explain the main results, as well as test their 
validity. This chapter includes seven specification checks on different aspects of the 
methodology and theme. A standard placebo test had to be excluded for lack of necessary 
data7.  
Even though none of the specification checks reject the empirical findings, they emphasize a 
need for a more precise research design and a more detailed treatment identification than this 
study’s year of intention to treat. 
 
7.1 Specification check I: Heterogeneity 
The first specification check relates to the subsample regressions of Chapter 6. Each 
individual control variable is interacted with the DD variable to understand how the group 
characteristics drive the results. The effect of SFO access on maternal employment can thus 
be analyzed along three dimensions: before and after reform, between treated and non-treated 
mothers, and between different subsamples.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 7.1, which is organized by the three different 
outcome variables. To correctly interpret the total treatment effect in the subsample, the single 
group-interaction coefficients from Table 7.1 must be added to the main DD estimate.  
The extensive margin in column (1) reveals that a high-educated mother in general would be 
10.57 percentage points more likely to be employed, but if she is a treatment group mother the 
likelihood decreases by -4.23 percentage points. The model reports that a high-educated 
treatment group mother after reform increases her probability of employment by 1.02 
percentage points relative to her hypothetical outcome8. Following this as a procedure of 
interpretation, column (1) reveals that the employment of foreign-born mothers responds 
negatively to SFO availability, while mothers less than 30 years of age respond highly 
positively. The effects on older mothers are not statistically significant.  
The intensive margin in column (2) shows positive average treatment effects for the oldest 
mothers, and negative or insignificant average treatment effects for every other subsample. 
																																								 																					
7 A placebo-tests checks whether the applied reform year is relevant by simulating reform in a year prior to 
reform. The main results pass the placebo-test if the test results are zero. I have data from only one year prior to 
reform and can, therefore, not produce such a test. 
8 In column (1): Estimate of Row 9 added to the estimate of Row 3. 
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Mothers with higher education are the only ones to increase their labor supply in the post-
reform period, but treated mothers with higher education do so to a lesser degree. 
The full-time employment share in column (3) increases post reform for all subsamples. 
However, all the DD coefficients are negative and not statistically significant. 
Overall, the results from Table 7.1 reflect the main empirical findings of chapter 6: SFO 
availability has a positive effect on maternal labor supply at the extensive margin, but seems 
to discourage labor supply at the intensive margin. The effects are the strongest among high-
educated mothers. 
 
7.2 Specification check II: Year-dummies 
One concern of the current research design is the construction of the comparison groups; the 
treated mothers and the non-treated mothers are likely to have different pre-reform SFO 
demand. Hence, as the children grow older, the positive employment trend of the treatment 
group might reflect a natural tendency towards higher employment. This implies that the main 
findings, instead of measuring policy effects, are driven by an endogenous positive 
employment trend in the treatment group.  
To investigate this matter, the employment development of the treatment group is examined 
and compared to the control group year by year in the post-reform period. Dummy variables 
representing each post-reform year are interacted with the DD variable. This enables me to 
understand how the groups behave relative to each other on a yearly basis. If the DD-year 
interactions closest to the reform year zero out the main DD estimate and the DD-year 
interactions furthest away from reform lose relevance in relation to the main DD estimate, the 
specification check might signal the natural tendency of increased employment as children 
grow older. 
In column (1), the DD estimate of Row (3) is highly statistically significant with a value of 
8.89 percentage points. This indicates a general positive employment evolution in the 
treatment group relative to the control group. By considering the DD-year interactions, 
however, it becomes evident that positive employment effects do not occur until 1999. 
In column (2) the negative effects appear to be immediate, even though the main DD estimate 
is not statistically significant and a definite conclusion cannot be drawn. Looking at column 
(3), the negative effects manifest themselves for years after the reform.  
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I consider the specification test results not to reject the main results completely, because 
policy can actually have long-term effects. Nevertheless, the results of Table 7.2 are 
suggesting that a more comparable comparison groups and a stronger treatment-received 
instrument are preferable. 
 
7.3 Specification check III: Instant impact 
In columns (1), (3) and (5) of Table 7.3, I look at the instant impact of reform in another way 
than by using a sample consisting of observations from the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 only. 
The results reproduce the overall effects from the main findings, indicating a relatively 
immediate response. This is especially true at the extensive margin of employment, estimated 
at 1.68 percentage points, which is also statistically significant. This effect reduces the initial 
employment gap by 47 percent9. For the intensive margin and full-time employment, 
estimates are not statistically significant. These results are graphically illustrated by Figures 
A.5 to A.8 in the appendix and demonstrate a sudden increase in employment. 
 
7.4 Specification check IV: Mothers to 6-year-olds 
As previously addressed, the chosen research design uses intention-to-treat as treatment, and 
not treatment received; all mothers with eligible children receive the Reform97 policy 
treatment in the year SFO is introduced in their municipality, whether their child in reality 
attends SFO or not. 
While SFO attendance is not known for the children of my sample mothers, Figure 4.4 shows 
that the SFO coverage rate was highest generally among 6-year-olds and 7-year-old. More 
recent official figures reveal that this feature of SFO consumption is similar geographically 
(Utdanningsdirektoratet, 2019). Differently expressed, mothers to 6 or 7 year old children are 
more often true treatment receivers than mothers to older children. Possible causes for this are 
higher demand for SFO for younger children, or potentially preferential treatment by the 
municipalities, or perhaps the knowledge that the child is eligible to attend SFO in several 
years to come. 
																																								 																					
9 Calculated from 1.68 as a share of 3.59. 
	40	
I have interpreted previously found effects of intention-to-treat on employment as driven by 
children actually attending SFO. For this hypothesis to hold, mothers who are truly higher 
receivers of treatment should see a higher average effect on employment than the full sample. 
I have estimated [3] using mothers of 6-year-olds as a subsample and the same control group 
as in the main regressions. The estimation results in columns (2), (4) and (6) in Table 7.3 are 
similar to the main findings, but have a stronger magnitude. The results are illustrated in 
Figures A.9 to A.12 in the appendix and show a quick labor market response to reform – at 
every employment measure. This supports the validity of intention-to-treat as a proxy for 
treatment received, but also emphasize the need to know the extent of policy received to 
better understand maternal workforce dynamics. 
 
7.5 Specification check V: Simulation 
In this specification check, I examine whether there are underlying trends other than caused 
by Reform97 driving the main findings. For that, I estimate [3] using the same definition of 
treatment and control group, but with a sample consisting of mothers living in the 63 
registered municipalities that are not defined as Reform97-municipalities, but already had 
organized SFO before 1997. These mothers are in the same situation at the same time, and 
their employment should be driven by the same underlying trends, with the exception of 
trends happening specifically and exclusively across the 44 Reform97-municipalities. I have 
named this specification check “Simulation”, as it resembles a simulation of Reform97, even 
though these 63 municipalities in fact also were affected by the school reform. However, they 
did not introduce after-school care as a direct response to Reform97. 
Columns (1), (3) and (5) in Table 7.4 display highly similar estimates as the main results of 
Table 6.1. The similarity of these results suggests a general upwards employment trend of 
mothers with young primary school children during the late 1990s, which might challenge the 
validity of the identification strategy. 
On the other hand, Reform97 did in fact impact all the municipalities in 1997. As illustrated 
by Figure 3.3, there was a general positive trend in SFO coverage in the period from 1996 to 





7.6 Specification check VI: Urban drivers 
Employment characteristics often diverge between individuals residing in urban centers 
versus in district areas, and that may also be the case in this analysis. To investigate this, the 
models have been reestimated without individuals living in municipalities housing more than 
25 000 inhabitants, namely Sandnes and Ringerike. 
The results seem not to be greatly affected. The DD estimate of the intensive margin (in 
column (4) of Table 7.4), however, is much smaller than its main sample equivalent (in Table 
6.1). Given that mothers with higher education dominate the effects at the intensive 
employment margin, the specification check results are likely due to female higher education 
being an urban area phenomenon. 
 
7.7 Specification check VII: Larger control group 
The control group of the main regressions has, until now, contained mothers with children 
aged 10, 11 or 12 in 1996. The group was defined as such to ensure that control group 
mothers could not receive treatment after reform, nor had access to it prior to reform.  
In this specification check, I construct a new control group: all mothers who do not have any 
children aged 6, 7 or 8 years in 1996 are included. This approach has a clear weakness: the 
newly added control group mothers with a child below 6 years old in 1996, will see their child 
be eligible for SFO during the time period of my analysis. This will interfere with the results. 
Nevertheless, I estimate the model and find that the results display similar, but smaller effects 
than the main results. These are presented in Table 7.5. The smaller effects are likely to be 
explained by new control group mothers also having children eligible for SFO. 
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Table 7.1 Specification check I: Heterogeneity interactions included. Extensive margin, 







Treatment -.0423*** -.0219*** .0093 
 (.0083) (.0081) (.0134) 
    
Post-reform .1912*** .3974*** .1200*** 
 (.0086) (.0160) (.0072) 
    
Diff-in-diff .0397*** -.0179 .0065 
 (.0128) (.0203) (.0150) 
    
Foreign-born -.0818*** .0207 .0239 
 (.0172) (.0225) (.0272) 
    
High-educated .1057*** .0559*** .1208*** 
 (.0089) (.0123) (.0095) 
    
Younger mom -.0528*** .0240 .0114 
 (.0180) (.0270) (.0256) 
    
Older mom -.0174 -.0218** .0225** 
 (.0104) (.0087) (.0090) 
    
Foreign-born*Diff-in-diff -.0456** -.0648 -.0242 
 (.0223) (.0540) (.0490) 
    
High-educated*Diff-in-diff -.0195* -.0295** -.0308 
 (.0105) (.0143) (.0222) 
    
Younger mom*Diff-in-diff .0419** .0260 -.0336 
 (.0199) (.0306) (.0217) 
    
Older mom*Diff-in-diff -.0145 .0356*** -.0188 
 (.0200) (.0270) (.0265) 
    
Intercept .5661*** .0054 .3612*** 
 (.0075) (.0118) (.0083) 
N 104 102 33 736 60 144 
R2 within .0461 .0834 .0188 
R2 between .0649 .0079 .0027 
R2 overall .0462 .0809 .0181 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Heterogeneity int. Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 








Table 7.2 Specification check II: Year-dummies included. Extensive margin, intensive margin 







Treatment -.0512*** -.0230*** .0125 
 (.0065) (.0049) (.0135) 
    
Post-reform .2258*** .4927*** .1722*** 
 (.0231) (.0510) (.0223) 
    
Diff-in-diff .0889*** .0578 -.0017 
 (.0152) (.0451) (.0278) 
    
Year 97 -.1544***-. -.3584*** -.1536*** 
 (.0187) (.0404) (.0195) 
    
Year 98 -.0767** -.2030*** -.1056*** 
 (.0294) (.0673) (.0251) 
    
Year 99 -.0741*** -.2040*** -.1042*** 
 (.0129) (.0337) (.0154) 
    
Year 2000 -.0430*** -.1121*** -.0706*** 
 (.0124) (.0303) (.0133) 
    
Year 2001 -.0022 -.0412 -.0421*** 
 (.0137) (.0307) (.0122) 
    
Year 2002 .0217 .0518* .0110 
 (.0136) (.0305) (.0127) 
    
Year 1997*Diff-in-diff -.0890*** -.0879* -.0054 
 (.0192) (.0455) (.0255) 
    
Year 1998*Diff-in-diff -.0944*** -.1476** -.0349 
 (.0277) (.0676) (.0273) 
    
Year 1999*Diff-in-diff -.0560*** -.0818** .0207 
 (.0130) (.0326) (.0177) 
    
Year 2000*Diff-in-diff -.0471*** -.0978** -.0330* 
 (.0129) (.0330) (.0176) 
    
Year 2001*Diff-in-diff -.0425*** -.0771** -.0241 
 (.0134) (.0342) (.0155) 
    
Year 2002*Diff-in-diff -.0397*** -.0923*** -.0356** 
 (.0132) (.0309) (.0149) 
    
Intercept .5812*** .0343** .3824*** 
 (.0075) (.0147) (.0109) 
N 104 102 33 736 60 144 
R2 within .0684 .1600 .0301 
R2 between .0493 .0153 .0061 
R2 overall .0683 .1563 .0291 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7.3 Specification checks III and IV. Extensive margin, intensive margin and full-time 
employment, respectively. OLS. 



















Treatment -.0359*** -.0592*** -.0154*** -.0403*** .0193 .0219 
 (.0071) (.0114) (.0047) (.0116) (.0126) (.0176) 
          
Post-reform .1009*** .1908*** .1944*** .3975*** .0391*** .1220*** 
 (.0086) (.0087) (.0158) (.0160) (.0051) (.0063) 
       
Diff-in-diff .0168** .0458*** -.0149 -.0327 -.0071 -.0425** 
 (.0051) (.0081) (.0134) (.0255) (.0103) (.0175) 
       
Intercept .5561*** .5685*** .0215** .0098*** .3717*** .3647*** 
 (.0062) (.0080) (.0096) (.0130) (.0105) (.0080) 
N 39 072 75 288 12 651 24 960 22 554 44 184 
R2 within .0323 .0430 .0678 .0848 .0133 .0196 
R2 between .0287 .0523 .0439 .0369 .0005 .0160 
R2 overall .0325 .0434 .0613 .0823 .0128 .0190 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table 7.4 Specification checks V and VI. Extensive margin, intensive margin and full-time 
employment, respectively. OLS. 













Treatment -.0548*** -.0482*** -.0124*** -.0246*** .0400*** .0076 
 (.0084) (.0091) (.0034) (.0061) (.0115) (.0170) 
          
Post-reform .2050*** .1833*** .4546*** .3849*** .1382*** .1135*** 
 (.0033) (.0083) (.0088) (.0182) (.0047) (.0082) 
       
Diff-in-diff .0411*** .0348*** -.0442*** -.0053 -.0514*** -.0098 
 (.0041) (.0077) (.0118) (.0060) (.0098) (.0105) 
       
Intercept .5652*** .5751*** -.0222** .0205 .4278*** .3761*** 
 (.0057) (.0081) (.0102) (.0128) (.0070) (.0095) 
N 237 457 72 392 68 320 23 648 137 368 42 088 
R2 within .0468 .0468 .0937 .0820 .0157 .0181 
R2 between .0977 .0934 .1531 .0187 .0102 .0058 
R2 overall .0472 .0470 .0933 .0787 .0171 .0173 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 




Table 7.5 Specification check VII. Extensive margin, intensive margin and full-time 







Treatment -.0288*** -.0064** -.0229** 
 (.0051) (.0027) (.0108) 
    
Post-reform .2093*** .3872*** .0981*** 
 (.0085) (.0139) (.0063) 
    
Diff-in-diff .0177*** -.0162 -.0041 
 (.0043) (.0137) (.0113) 
    
Intercept .5509*** .0077 .4048*** 
 (.0064) (.0113) (.0074) 
N 236 376 71 800 134 648 
R2 within .0459 .0798 .0200 
R2 between .0158 .0053 .0332 
R2 overall .0457 .0781 .0196 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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8 Concluding Remarks 
After-school care is a family policy instrument intended to help parents combine career and 
family life. It is considered particularly relevant for mothers, whose inclusion in the 
workforce is high on the political agenda. 
In this master thesis, I have used a difference-in-differences research design to evaluate the 
effects of after-school care availability on maternal employment. Following a 1997 school 
reform in Norway, a considerable amount of mothers saw their municipalities be obliged to 
facilitate public after-school care. 
The main contribution of this study is two-fold. First and foremost, the Norwegian reform 
encourages more women to enter the labor market. Simultaneously, however, after-school 
care seems to discourage part-time employed mothers to pursue more work. The second result 
might suggest an income effect, whereby mothers remain part-time employed, not because 
they must care for children, but because they are subject to cheap childcare arrangements and 
hence, have a lower need for additional income. 
The presented estimates are limited to the short-term benefits of after-school care. The DD 
method seeks immediate labor market results, while the adaptation of mothers to after-school 
care availability might react over the course of several years, including through affecting the 
birth rate of working mothers. 
The identification strategy involves estimating intention-to-treat effects, giving only an 
indication as to the true effects of the policy. The conclusions from a wide range of 
specification checks emphasize the need for a more accurate identification mechanism of the 
policy treatment. The findings from these tests do not categorically reject the main empirical 
findings, but uncover some underlying trends, which might drive the estimations, both within 
subsamples of the treatment group, and across the treatment and control groups. These 
secondary results should be investigated further. 
To whom the necessary data becomes available, I would recommend following the 
comprehensive empirical strategy of Andresen and Havnes (2018), and to use a more 
sophisticated instrument, which better captures the treatment-received effect. No less 
importantly, analyzing the long-term effects of affordable, broadly provided, high quality 
after-school care could reveal benefits yet to come.  
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Arendal Gran Masfjorden Skjervøy Vågsøy
Aurskog-Høland Granvin Meland Smøla Vågå
Balestrand Grue Midsund Snåsa Våler
Ballangen Halsa Nedre Eiker Sola Ørland
Berg Hammerfest Nesset Solund Øygarden
Berlevåg Hemne Nome Spydeberg Årdal
Bjerkreim Hemsedal Nordkapp Stange Ås
Bodø Herøy Nordre Land Stavanger
Bykle Hjartdal Oppegård Stor-Elvdal
Bø Hobøl Rakkestad Stordal
Bømlo Hol Randaberg Sula
Eide Hornindal Rindal Surnadal
Eidfjord Horten Ringerike Sveio
Eidsberg Hurdal Ringsaker Svelvik
Etnedal Høyanger Risør Sør-Aurdal
Fauske Jondal Rygge Sørum
Fitjar Kvinnherad Saltdal Time
Fjell Lenvik Sandnes Trysil
Flakstad Lesja Sauherad Tysnes
Frei Lier Sel Utsira
Froland Lierne Selje Vega
Fræna Lund Seljord Vegårshei
Fyresdal Lunner Siljan Vestre Slidre
Gjerstad Lyngen Ski Vestre Toten






emp0 Dummy equal 1 if unemployed.
emp1 Dummy equal 1 if weekly hours worked between 4 and 19 hours.
emp2 Dummy equal 1 if weekly hours worked between 20 and 29 hours.
emp3 Dummy equal 1 if weekly hours worked over 30 hours. Full-time employment.
parttime Dummy equal 1 if part-time employed.
working Dummy equal 1 if employed. 
morejob Dummy equal 1 if the year's labor supply is higher than the pre-reform level.
immigrant Dummy equal 1 if not born in Norway.
highedmother Dummy equal 1 if years of education over 12 years.
youngermom Dummy equal 1 if age under 30 years in 1996.
midoldmom Dummy equal 1 if age between 30 and 39 years in 1996.
oldmom Dummy equal 1 if age 40 years and over in 1996.
age6 Dummy equal 1 if child aged 6 years old.
age7 Dummy equal 1 if child aged 7 years old.
age8 Dummy equal 1 if child aged 8 years old.
age9 Dummy equal 1 if child aged 9 years old.
age10 Dummy equal 1 if child aged 10 years old.
age11 Dummy equal 1 if child aged 11 years old.
age12 Dummy equal 1 if child aged 12 years old in.
Reform97 Dummy equal 1 if treatment municipality, 0 if control municipality.
treatment In a treatment municipality: Dummy equal 1 if mother to child aged 6 to 9 years old in 1996.
control In a treatment municipality: Dummy equal 1 if mother to child aged 10 to 12 years old in 1996.
postreform Dummy equal 1 for all years from 1997 onwards.
did (1) Interaction between treated and and postreform.
(2) Interaction between Reform97 and postreform.
conservative Dummy equal 1 if the number of votes for Conservative Party or Progress Party as share of total votes in the 
municipality during the parliament election of 1996 was higher than the equivalent median share of votes among 
the selected municipalities.
oldwomen Dummy equal 1 if the number of women aged 50 and above as share of all women in the municipality was.
higher than the equivalent median share among the selected municipalities. Year 1997
lowerincome Dummy equal 1 if the share of people aged 17 and abover in the municipality earning below 300 000 NOK was 
higher than the equivalent share among the selected municipalities. Year 1997.
femaleunemp Dummy equal 1 if the municipal share of unemployed women between 16 and 66 years of age is above the 
equivalent median share of selected municipalities. Year 1997.
maleunemp Dummy equal 1 if the municipal share of unemployed men between 16 and 66 years of age is above the
equivalent median share of selected municipalities. Year 1997.
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A.3 Comparing Reform97-municipalities to other municipalities 
 




Conservative vote -.1498 
(Share of votes for Conservative Party or Progressive Party 1996-election) (.1143) 
  
Women over 50 years old .1660 
(Share of women over 50 years of age of all women) (.1085) 
  
Low average income -.1162 
 (.1133) 
  
Female unemployment rate .1191 
 (.1038) 
  







Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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3) Empirical results from the alternative strategy 
 
Table A.2 Descriptive statistics of alternative sample. 









Employment variables     
Employment 54.77 55.70 88.66 89.52 
        Full-time employed 45.13 51.99 59.52 66.38 
        Part-time employed, 4-19 hours 28.04 25.51 18.81 15.49 
        Part-time employed, 20-29 hours 26.82 22.50 21.67 18.13 
Control variables     
Age, mother 33.75 34.09 40.75 41.09 
Higher education, share of mothers 57.63 61.19 57.63 61.19 
Immigrant, share of mothers 5.78 7.18 5.78 7.18 
Age, father1 36.72 36.96 43.64 43.91 
Higher education, share of fathers 61.21 65.94 61.36 65.68 
Observations 7 735 17 513 7 735 17 513 
1Number of observations for fathers in equal horizontal order: 7 112; 16 768; 7 156; 16 904 
 
 
Table A.3 Alternative sample regressions. Extensive margin, intensive margin and full-time 
employment, respectively. OLS. 

















Treated -.0001  .0483***  -.0360  
 (.0149)  (.0146)  (.0236)  
       
Post-reform .2461*** .2461*** .4104*** .4104*** .0868*** .0868*** 
 (.0046) (.0046) (.0094) (.0094) (.0065) (.0065) 
       
Diff-in-diff -.0191** -.0191** -.0379** -.0369** .0034 -.0033 
 (.0088) (.0088) (.0155) (.0155) (.0121) (.0121) 
       
Intercept .5607*** .5209*** -.0182*** -.0166** .4640*** .4610*** 
 (.0085) (.0053) (.0068) (.0082) (.0157) (.0116) 
N 147 136 147 136 39 960 39 960 80 976 80 976 
R2 within .0362 .0507 .0794 .0815 .0037 .0112 
R2 between .0073 .0680 .0001 .0001 .0276 .0095 
R2 overall .0356 .0508 .0769 .0797 .0066 .0123 
Individual controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Municipal FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
*Note: As treatment is defined as the individual’s municipality of residence’s status as Reform97, the inclusion 









Figure A.2 Employment statuses from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. 







Figure A.3 Employment statuses from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. 








A.4  Figures related to the specification checks 
A.4.1 Specification check III: Shorter time periode: 1996 to 1998 
 
 
Figure A.5 Employment rate from 1996 to 1998.  




Figure A.6 Employment statuses from 1996 to 1998. Treatment group vs. Control group. 





Figure A.7 Employment statuses from 1996 to 1998. Treatment group vs. Control group. 









A.4.2 Specification check IV: Mothers with children aged 6 in 1996 
 
 
Figure A.9 Employment rate from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. New 
treatment group: Mothers with children aged 6 in 1996. From main sample. 
 
 
Figure A.10 Employment statuses from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. 
New treatment group: Mothers with children aged 6 in 1996. From main sample: Part-time 




Figure A.11 Employment statuses from 1996 to 2003 Treatment group vs. Control group. 





Figure A.12 Employment statuses from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. 





A.4.3 Specification check VII: Expanded control group 
 
 
Figure A.13 Employment rate from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. 




Figure A.14 Employment statuses from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. 






Figure A.15 Employment statuses from 1996 to 2003. Treatment group vs. Control group. 




Figure A.16 Employment status from 1996 to 1998. Treatment group vs. Control group. 
Expanded control group. 
 
